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Abstract—Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) works by fre-
quently exchanging updates which, disseminate reachability infor-
mation (RI) about IP prefixes (i.e., address blocks) between Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes) on the Internet. The current operation
of BGP implicitly trusts the ASes to disseminate valid — accurate,
stable and routing policy compliant — RI. This assumption is
problematic as demonstrated by the recent documented instances
of invalid RI dissemination. This paper presents AS-TRUST, a
scheme which comprehensively characterizes the trustworthiness
of ASes, with respect to disseminating valid RI. AS-TRUST quan-
tifies trust using the notion of reputation. To compute reputation,
AS-TRUST evaluates the past RI received for validity, based on
a set of well-defined properties. It then classifies the resulting
observations into multiple types of feedback. The feedback is
used by a reputation function to compute a probabilistic view
of AS trustworthiness. The contributions of the paper are: (1) a
comprehensive trust characterization of ASes; (2) a set of well-
defined properties for evaluating the validity of RI provided
by ASes; and (3) a novel and theoretically sound reputation
computation mechanism. Our implementation of AS-TRUST
scheme using publicly available BGP traces demonstrates: the
number of ASes involved in violating the BGP operational
trust assumption is significant, dissemination of invalid RI is
consistently present, and the proposed reputation mechanism
is sensitive enough to capture even rare instances of an AS’
deviation from trustworthy behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large IP domains, called Autonomous Systems (ASes) use
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) as the standard commu-
nication protocol. BGP enables ASes to exchange IP prefix
(i.e., address blocks) reachability information with each other,
through periodic propagation of update messages. The reacha-
bility information (RI) within a BGP update consists of: an IP
prefix, and an ordered list of ASes, called AS PATH, through
which the prefix is reachable. One of the major operational
assumptions of BGP is that the RI provided by the ASes is
valid. We define RI validity as: (1) the information in the
updates are legal and correct, (2) the ASes in the AS PATH
provide a stable route to the prefix, and (3) no routing
policies are violated in the process of propagating the updates.
However, over the past decade, it has been seen that this
assumption is not entirely true. Documented evidence — of
prefix hijacking, where an AS claims to reach a prefix, contrary
to its actual capability [5], [10]; routing policy violation, which
This research was supported in part by ONR MURI N00014-07-1-0907.
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might prevent BGP convergence in the long run [2]; and
unstable or potentially spoofed link insertion in the AS PATH
to make it more attractive [23] — demonstrate as such.
It can be seen that ASes cannot be completely trusted to
disseminate valid RI at all times. Therefore, it is essential to
quantify the extent to which individual ASes can be trusted.
Trust is defined as the competence of an entity to exhibit a
specific behavior(s) [15]. In the context of BGP, the entity is an
AS and the expected behavior is disseminating valid RI. Trust
value for ASes should be adaptive to the behavioral changes
in ASes over time. The quantification of AS’ trustworthiness
has two main advantages: (1) it provides a global view of the
current state of inter-domain routing and the extent to which
it is plagued by the aforementioned hijacking, stability and
policy violation issues, and (2) it can potentially minimize the
venues available for spammers and hackers to exploit if the
AS trustworthiness information is made available to the entire
BGP community.
In this paper, we present AS-TRUST, a novel scheme for
quantifying the level of trust an one can have on ASes in
terms of disseminating valid RI. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first attempt to re-examine the operational
trust assumption of BGP in a quantitative manner. In AS-
TRUST, trust is represented using a metric called reputation.
To compute the reputation of an AS, AS-TRUST evaluates
past RI received, for exhibition of specific behaviors, based on
well-defined properties. The behavior the evaluation provides
feedback to a reputation function to generate a probabilistic
view of the trustworthiness of all the observable ASes in
the Internet. The AS-TRUST scheme can be implemented
by anyone with access to BGP updates such as, individual
Autonomous Systems or third parties with access to BGP
traces collector, e.g., RouteViews [11].
The principal contributions of this paper are: (1) consid-
eration of a comprehensive set of behaviors in computing the
trustworthiness of an AS; (2) identification of a set of metrics
for accurately detecting each of the AS behaviors of interest;
and (3) a reputation computation scheme which provides a
probabilistic view of AS trustworthiness based on Bayesian
statistics. Our implementation of AS-TRUST demonstrates: (1)
the incidents of poor behaviors (i.e., disseminating invalid RI)
is consistently present, (2) a considerable percentage of ASes
(5-6%) are involved in some form of poor behaviors with
a handful exhibiting poor behavior exclusively, and (3) the
proposed reputation mechanism is sensitive enough to capture
even rare instances of deviation from trustworthy behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
background on BGP and the problem statement. Section III
presents details of AS-TRUST including the notion of BGP
service, feedback mechanism employed and the reputation
model. Section IV presents the properties for evaluating the
BGP services. Section V presents the AS reputation compu-
tation and analysis. Section VI presents the result summary.
Section VII presents the related work followed by Section
VIII, which concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Border Gateway Protocol
The Border Gateway Protocol is a path-vector routing pro-
tocol for exchanging information about reaching IP prefixes.
Using BGP, each AS informs its neighbors about the best
available route to a prefix it owns — is directly reachable
from the AS. In this regard, AS sends out a BGP update
message announcing the prefix. Similarly, an AS can withdraw
a prefix that it has previously announced. Each AS through
which the update passes adds its AS number to the message.
This ordered list of ASes called the AS PATH informs an AS
receiving the update, the path through which the prefix can be
reached. When an update is received by an AS containing a
prefix announcement, it has to determine whether it should be
accepted or not. Acceptance means that the AS is willing to
add the route to its routing information base. Each AS has its
set of custom policies that determine whether it should accept
an update. Routing policies serve the additional purpose at
the ASes of selecting proper neighbors to export the accepted
route. One of the most common export policies is adherence
to the principle of Valley Free Routing (VFR). An AS PATH
is said to adhere to valley-free routing if it meets the following
three conditions: (1) no AS forwards a route received from its
provider1 to another provider, (2) a path does not have more
than one peer-to-peer links, and (3) a path may not contain two
peers separated by one or more non-peer AS. Adherence to
VFR is important as it has been shown to ensure the eventual
convergence of BGP [14].
B. Problem Statement and Approach
The current version of BGP [1] was designed with only
effectiveness in mind. It implicitly assumes ASes can be
trusted to provide valid prefix reachability information. RI in
an update is considered valid, if it exhibits five behaviors:
• Legality: The values of the AS number and the prefix in
the RI are legal.
• Accuracy: The information regarding the prefix and the
ASes in the AS PATH of the RI is accurate.
• Unwavering: An AS announcing prefixes it owns, should
do so in a reasonably sustained manner.
1ASes and their neighbors usually have one of the four relationships:
provider-to-customer (Pv2C), customer-to-provider (C2Pv), sibling-to-sibling
(S2S), and (P2P) peer-to-peer.
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Fig. 1. Data Source Time Windows
• Valley Free Path: The AS PATH of a RI is valley free.
• Stable AS-Links: The AS-links (i.e., each hop between
individual ASes) in the AS PATH of a RI persist in a
reasonably sustained manner.
The principal problem this paper tries to address is to
develop a behavior model for ASes. In other words, AS-
TRUST tries to answer the question - what is the probability
with which an AS disseminates valid reachability information?
This is done by computing the trust one can have in ASes
satisfying the aforementioned five behaviors. In this regard,
we use the notion of reputation. Reputation is a quantitative
measure of an entity’s likelihood to perform a specific task
based on its past performance [18]. The idea is to compute
the reputation for all the ASes in the Internet based on the
RI received in the past. This is done in four steps following
the traditional manner of reputation computation [18]: (1)
collecting BGP updates in a database; (2) evaluating the
data in the database, over a well-defined duration called the
learning window, for the exhibition of the aforementioned
five behaviors; (3) recording the results of the analysis as
feedback; and (4) using feedback to compute reputation for
the ASes. Reputation is a dynamic value which changes as
the AS behavior changes, over time. This is accomplished by
repeating the evaluation process over a sliding window and
generating updated feedback.
C. Experiment Setup
We implemented the proposed scheme and conducted a six
month long experiment measuring the evolving trustworthiness
of ASes, on an Internet-scale. To receive the latest BGP up-
dates, we use the RouteViews BGP trace collector, maintained
by University of Oregon [11]. The RouteViews trace collector
is a group of BGP routers which peer with a large number of
ISPs via BGP sessions. At the time of writing, the RouteViews
received BGP updates from 46 ASes. It has been shown in
[25] that RouteViews receives RI from almost all the ASes
currently active within the Internet and is therefore a good
source for computing reputation of ASes.
In this work, we use BGP update data from Nov. 1, 2009 -
Jun. 28, 2010 (see Figure 1). We take BGP updates received
over a 60 day period called the learning window, evaluate
the AS behavior, and compute reputation for the ASes on the
61st day. For example, data from Nov. 1, 2009 to Dec. 30,
2009 is analyzed to compute AS reputation on Jan. 1, 2010.
The learning window is then slid forward by one day and the
whole process is repeated. In order to be fair to ASes, we did
not consider RI announced within 24 hours of the end of the
learning window in computing the reputation of the ASes as
they have not had enough time to prove themselves. There are
over 180 learning windows between Nov. 1, 2009 and Jun. 28,
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2010. The 60 day learning window was chosen as it was long
enough to prevent the behavior evaluation from being biased
by transient AS behavior.
III. REPUTATION COMPUTATION FOR AUTONOMOUS
SYSTEMS
This section provides an overview of the principal aspects of
computing trustworthiness of ASes. We begin by formalizing
the notion of BGP service which forms the basis of the whole
process. We then present the mechanism for obtaining feed-
backs. In the subsequent sections we describe the evaluation
process and reputation computation, respectively.
A. BGP Service
The principal task of BGP is to facilitate the dissemination
of routing information. We model the dissemination of routing
information using a novel notion called BGP service. A BGP
service is a formal way of viewing RI provided collectively by
the ASes in the AS PATH, called providers2, to an observer
AS receiving a BGP update. It is defined as:
Si = {pi,AS PATH = [AS0, . . . , ASN ]}
Here Si is the service identifier indexed by i, pi is the
prefix being announced by AS0 as a part of the service Si,
and AS0, . . . , ASN ∈ AS PATH are the provider ASes which
forward the reachability information as a part of the service
Si. Figure 2 illustrates the principal concepts and entities of a
BGP service. A service said to have started when a provider
AS announces a particular prefix and ended when the prefix
is withdrawn. A service can therefore be in two modes: active
and inactive. A service is said to be active, if it has started
but not ended; and inactive if it has ended. An inactive service
has to have been active, at least once, in the past. Each time
a service is active, it is called an instance of that service. The
bottom half of the Figure 2 illustrates some of these concepts
over a time-line of a service.
2These are different from notion used in the context of VFR. Here, the
term provider ASes mean provider of a service. In the rest of the paper,
unless otherwise specified, the term provider refers to provider ASes.
A BGP service can be decomposed into three orthogonal
service elements, each of which are provided by a subset of
provider: (1) AS-prefix binding: a tuple of the form (AS0, p),
which is established when an AS0 announces a prefix p and is
broken when the prefix is withdrawn. Each BGP service has
one AS-prefix binding in it. This service element is provided
by AS0. (2) AS-path vector: is synonymous with the the
AS PATH in the service. It is said to be provided collectively
by all the providers; and (3) AS-link binding: a tuple of the
form (ASi, ASj), which is established when ASi forwards an
update to ASj . The AS-link binding is broken when no service
uses it. A service has N − 1 AS-link bindings; one between
each of the N ASes in the AS PATH. This service element
is said to be provided individually by the all providers to the
observer. In the rest of the paper, we use the term AS-link
bindings and AS-links, interchangeably.
Upon observing a BGP service, the observer decomposes
it into its constituent service elements, each of which is then
evaluated on its validity. The results of the evaluation act as
a feedback on the providers of the service element. The next
sub-section describes the behaviors used for evaluation of the
service elements, followed by the feedback mechanism used.
Note that, all behavior evaluation and feedback generation are
performed locally at the observer.
B. Behavior Evaluation
We propose three behavior sets, one corresponding to each
service element, for behavior evaluation. The three behavior
sets comprehensively cover the principal aspects of BGP
operation. They are:
• Behavior Set 1 (Bp): Requires that an AS announce
only those prefixes which it owns, and that the prefixes
announced are not bogons (i.e., unallocated IP prefixes).
The observance of Bp is important as it ensures that there
are no prefix hijacking — announcement of prefixes not
owned by an AS — being mounted, among other things.
• Behavior Set 2 (Bo): Requires that no AS in the AS PATH
violates the valley free routing requirement, and that the
AS numbers on the AS PATH vector are legal3. Detecting
valley routes are importance because VFR has been
shown to be a sufficient condition to ensure that BGP
converges [14], and is thus essential for the sustenance
of BGP over the long run.
• Behavior Set 3 (Bl): Requires that AS-links in the
AS PATH last for a substantial duration of time. Detect-
ing such unstable AS-link bindings is important since
ASes which chose a path with one or more unstable
AS-links faces a high probability that the path will not
be adhered to during data communication. Such a path
choice may also have unintended consequences such as
increased latency. Moreover, unstable AS-links can also
indicate the potential of them being artificially introduced
(i.e., spoofed) [21], [22].
3A 16-bit AS number is illegal if its value is in the range of 64496-64511
which is reserved for use in documentation and sample code, 64512-65534
designated for private use) or 65535 which is reserved [6].
3
BGP Services
Decompose
BGP Updates
Extract
Bp Evaluation
Threshold Selection
IRR Database
AS-Prefix Binding
Reputation
RG RB RU
Calculate
Feedback
FG FB FU
BGP Service
BGP Updates
Bl Evaluation
Threshold Selection
CAIDA & DIMES 
Data-plane Probing
AS-Link Binding
Reputation
R’’G R’’B R’’U
Calculate
Feedback
F’’G F’’B F’’U
Bo Evaluation
Gao’s Algorithm [14]
UCLA Topology
Database
Tier-I AS Heuristics
AS-Path Vector
Reputation
R’G R’B R’U
Calculate
Feedback
F’G F’B F’U
Service 
Elements
Fig. 3. ASCRED+ Service Analysis Workflow
It can be seen that there is a one-to-one mapping between the
service elements and the behavior sets. Therefore, evaluating
a service involves evaluating whether AS-prefix binding, AS-
path vector, and AS-link binding service elements satisfy Bp,
Bo, and Bl, respectively. But before we delve into the details
of evaluation, we provide a overview of our feedback mech-
anism which is essential for eventual reputation computation,
and forms an integral part of the evaluation process.
C. Feedback Mechanism
Evaluation of a BGP service element provides one of three
mutually exclusive feedbacks about the ASes. The feedback
mechanism utilized in this regard is similar to the one used in
[13] and can have one of three values: (1) Good: This feedback
is given on the providers which satisfies the requirements of
the appropriate behavior set; (2) Bad: This feedback is given
on the providers which do not satisfy the requirements of
the appropriate behavior set, however, they do not affect the
correct operation of BGP; and (3) Ugly: this feedback is given
on the providers which does not satisfy the requirements of the
appropriate behavior set, and can potentially subvert intended
BGP operation.
In the rest of the paper, we use the term GBU feedbacks
to refer to our feedback types. When the service element
implemented by the provider(s) receives a Good feedback,
it is referred to as good behavior. Conversely, a Bad or an
Ugly feedback for a service element is referred to as the
demonstration of poor behavior. In general, there exists a 3×3
feedback matrix for every provider ASa, at the observer, of
the form:
Fa =
 FG FB FUF ′G F ′B F ′U
F ′′G F
′′
B F
′′
U

where the element Fa(i, j) stores the details of the BGP
service which AS a provided when evaluated with respect to
the Behavior Set i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Finally, as the feedbacks
are generated locally at the observer AS, we do not have to
consider the case of potentially dishonest feedback affecting
Property Value
Avg. # of ASPB** Observed 421704.1
Avg. # of  ASPB Classified as Ugly 6955.61**
*
Avg. # of ASPB Classified as Bad 29256.6
Analysis of Bp*
Behavior Evaluation Results from Jan. 1, 2010 and Jun. 30, 2010 
(For each day, the analysis considers: I. BGP updates from the past 60 days for Bp and Bl, and 
II. AS relationship annotated topologies of the past 24 hours for Bo)
Avg. # unique AS Observed 35448.2
Avg. # of AS announcing Bad ASPB 1132.8
Avg. # of AS announcing Ugly ASPB 605.5
Avg. # of AS exclusively announcing 
Bad ASPB
17.8
Avg. # of AS exclusively announcing 
Ugly ASPB
54.3
* No bogons were observed during the behavior analysis periods
** ASPB: AS-prefix bindings
*** The actual value was a higher than usual 16882.1 due to the 
Internet scale prefix hijacking mounted by AS23724 on April 
8th, 2010.
Property Value
Avg. # of Paths 661395.7
Avg. # of Valley Routes 3447.8
Avg. #  of AS creating Valley 
Routes
89.2
Avg. # of BGP services 
containing illegal AS number
44.1
Property Value
Avg. # of AS-links Observed 94754.2
Avg. # of Stable AS-links 91143.6
Avg. # of Unstable AS-links 3610.6
Avg. # of unique AS Observed 35667.2
Avg. # of AS announcing 
Unstable AS-links
1945.7
Avg. # of AS exclusively 
announcing Unstable AS-links
67.4
Analysis of Bo
Analysis of Bl
Fig. 4. AS Behavior Evaluation Statistics
our reputation computation outcome.
IV. BGP SERVICE EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK
In this section, we describe the metrics used in the behav-
ior evaluation of service elements. These metrics allow the
feedback matrix to be populated, which will subsequently be
used to compute reputation. As mentioned earlier, the behavior
evaluation considers BGP services received during a 60 day
learning window and produces feedback on the providers,
on the 61st day. Figure 3 illustrates the work-flow of the
evaluation process discussed in this section. The boxes with
dashed outlines illustrate the output produced at the end of
analyzing a service based on each of three behavior sets.
A. Evaluation of Service using Bp
The behavior set Bp is responsible for checking the presence
of bogons and if an AS is announcing a prefix it owns.
Evaluating bongons involves a static check, while checking
for ownership is done indirectly based on the stability of the
AS-prefix binding. The principle idea of evaluating stability
comes from the observation that legitimate AS-prefix bindings
last long periods of time [12], [19].
1) Method: Determining whether an AS-prefix binding
(AS0, p) exhibits Bp was the main thrust of our previous
work [13]. Therefore, in the rest of the section we briefly
summarize the metrics used and evaluation described therein.
The evaluation is a three step process: (1) Stability Analysis:
For each (AS0, p) observed during the learning window, we
compute two metrics: prevalence and persistence. Prevalence
(Ps), is the total percentage of time an AS-prefix binding
is active within the learning window. Persistence (Pr), on
the other hand, is the average duration of time an AS-prefix
binding is active at one time, within the learning window
[13]; (2) Providing Feedback: The value of the Ps and Pr are
compared against a set of thresholds Tpr (1% of the learning
window) and TPs (10 hours)4 and feedback provided. Table
4Both the thresholds have been established empirically, based on lowest
false positive rates when compared with Internet Route Registries (IRR) [13].
4
TABLE I
Feedback for Behavior Evaluation based on Bp
Prevalence Persistence Classification Feedback Type
high high Good FG
high low Bad (Vacillation) FB
low high Good FG
low low Ugly (Hijack) FU
I shows the feedback matrix element updated for different
Pr and Ps values; and (3) Detecting Bogons: (AS0, p) is
also checked for the presence of bogons, and their discovery
results in FU being updated in the feedback matrix of the AS
announcing them.
2) Discussion: The case of Pr being high and Ps being low
demonstrates a vacillating nature of the AS-prefix binding.
Detailed analysis of such bindings demonstrate that they are
usually legitimate [13]. However, the AS-prefix binding ser-
vice element itself vacillates between being active and inactive
at a rate which is not conducive for data communication [13].
Consequently, we classify such vacillating behavior as Bad
because the ASes execute BGP’s functionality correctly but
fail to meet the requirement of the behavior set. As for bogons,
we believe their announcement subverts the operation of BGP
and we therefore deem them Ugly.
3) Results: The results of the evaluation, based on Bp, are
summarized in Figure 4. On average of 421704.1 AS-prefix
bindings were observed every learning window, out of which
an average of 4.0% were found to be Ugly5 involving 1.7% of
all the ASes. Similarly, about 6.9% of AS-prefix bindings were
classified as Bad, involving 3.1% of all the ASes. The number
of ASes displaying exclusively poor behaviors is lower still.
Finally, we observed zero occurrence of AS-prefix bindings
with bogon prefixes during any of the learning windows. We
believe this is because bogons are invariably filtered out by
ASes, which encounter them, and are never forwarded. The
results demonstrate that a relatively large number of ASes
(3-5%) are involved in announcing vacillating and hijacked
prefixes.
B. Evaluation of Service using Bo
Behavior set Bo checks for the exhibition of valley routes
and the introduction of illegal AS numbers in the AS PATH.
1) Method: To evaluate an AS-path vector based on Bo
is a five step process: (1) Generating AS Relationship Map:
Based on the BGP updates received over the past 24 hours, we
generate an AS-level Internet topology and infer relationships
between the ASes using Gao’s algorithm [14]; (2) Merging
Topologies: We then download that day’s annotated topology
from the UCLA’s Internet topology site [25] and merge it with
the topology we inferred previously; (3) Introduce Peers: We
obtain the list of all tier-1 ASes from [2]. All links between
tier-1 ASes are re-labeled peer-to-peer (P2P), and links be-
tween tier-1 AS and lower-tier AS are re-labeled Pv2C where
the tier-1 AS is the provider (Pv); (4) Providing Feedback:
Once the merged annotated topology has been created, the AS-
path service element of all the services announced that day is
5This number is unusually high due to the Internet-scale prefix hijacking
attempt on April 8th, 2010 by AS23724.
TABLE II
Feedback for Behavior Evaluation based on Bl
Prevalence Persistence Classification Feedback Type
high high Good F ′′G
high low Good F ′′G
low high Good F ′′G
low low Ugly (Unstable) F ′′U
evaluated for the existence of ASes which might violate VFR.
If such an AS is found, then its F ′B entry in its feedback matrix
is updated; and (5) Identifying Private ASes: The AS PATH is
finally examined for private AS numbers. This is done based
on a static check. The first legal AS, after the set of private
ones is blamed and its F ′B incremented. For all the other ASes
in AS PATH the FB entry is incremented.
2) Discussion: The use of two well-known AS topology
relationship inference techniques increases the confidence on
our own relationship labeling. We consider the violation of
VFR to be Bad because, though not good in the long run, it
does not necessarily affect the operation of BGP in providing
knowledge about routes to prefixes. In the case of private
ASes, the first non-private AS after a set of private ASes
is blamed because such leaking of private numbers usually
happens when an AS forgets to filter out local AS numbers
before forwarding the update for the service.
3) Results: The results of the evaluation, based on Bo,
are summarized in Figure 4. We found that, an average of
661395.7 paths were observed per day. Out of these, 0.5%
paths were found to violate VFR per day. Finally, an average
of 89.2 providers out of over 35K were were seen violating
VFR per day. On an average, we found only about 44.1 ASes
involved in allowing private AS numbers in the AS PATH, per
day, during the six months of behavior analysis with respect
to Bo. In summary, the non-adherence to Bo, especially valley
routes are prevalent and a recurring event in the day to day
operation of BGP, but on a much smaller scale.
C. Evaluation of Service using Bl
This behavior set is responsible for checking if an AS-link
binding (ASi, ASj) in the AS PATH is stable.
1) Method: Computing the stability of an AS-link binding
(ASi, ASj) in the AS PATH follows a similar approach to
AS-prefix binding stability evaluation, and uses the prevalence
and persistence metrics. The evaluation and feedback with
respect to Bl is done in three steps: (1) Identifying AS-link
Bindings: This generates a set L of all the AS-link bindings,
decomposed from the services observed during the learning
window; (2) Computing Stability Metrics: This step computes
the prevalence and persistence for each of the AS-link in set
L; (3) Providing Feedback: The computed Pr and Ps values
are then compared with a threshold T lPr and T lPs and a
feedback is provided. Table II shows the feedback matrix
element updated for different Pr and Ps values.
2) Discussion: The reason we classify unstable AS-links as
Ugly is because it is possible that poor AS-link stability is due
to an attempted link spoofing which could subvert the intended
BGP operation. It should be noted that it is difficult to get
conclusive proof for the spoofing given a lack of ground truth,
5
Fig. 5. Visualization of Unstable AS-Links and the Provider ASes
Involved
though we find an interesting result which strengthens the case
for their occurrence (see Section V-D). We therefore argue that
the potential of spoofing merits a punitive feedback for ASes
involved in unstable AS-links. The value of thresholds T lPr
and T lPs are set to 1% of the learning window and one hour,
respectively. These values are established empirically based on
comparison with a set of AS-links D. The set D is obtained
from data-plane probing database provided by the CAIDA [3]
and DIMES [4] projects. The thresholds are the values below
which, all the AS-links in the set L, with the particular Pr and
Ps, have the smallest intersection with the set D. Data-plane
probing is used because if a AS-link is ephemeral, it has a
low probability of being found in data-plane probing. Further,
it is the only form of ground-truth available, as can reliably
identify AS-links which are stable enough to allow data traffic
to pass through them [22].
3) Results: The results of analysis, based on Bl, reveals
that an average of 95640.4 AS-links observed during the each
of the learning windows. Out of these over 96.1% AS-links
received Good feedback. From the perspective of the ASes,
on average of 35667 ASes were seen every learning window,
out of which 5.4% ASes announced unstable AS-links at least
once. Only about an average of 0.18% of ASes announced
purely unstable AS-links (see Figure 4). Figure 5 visualizes
4625 unstable AS-links seen each month over the course of
the experiment involving 2305 ASes. The dots are the ASes
and the lines between them are unstable AS-links. The red
dots represent the 149 ASes which have established unstable
AS-links at least once every month, during the course of
our experiment. In summary, these results demonstrate that
unstable AS-links are a repetitive phenomena, affecting a
substantial number (5-6%) of ASes.
D. Overall Trend
In this section, we present the bigger picture that has
emerged from the behavior analysis during the six months of
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Fig. 6. Extent of Poor Behaviors in the Internet
our experiment. Figure 6 presents the extent of poor behavior
seen every day between Jan. 1, 2010 and Jun. 30, 2010.
The trend graphs provide an overview of the extent the poor
behaviors of ASes afflicting inter-domain routing and how
they have evolved over time. The numbers are raw-values
and include all AS-prefix bindings, AS PATHS and AS-links,
decomposed from the observed BGP services. It can be seen
that the number of RI with vacillating prefixes (over 10K)
is an order of magnitude larger than all others (100-1K).
Finally, the problem of poor behavior is consistently present
over the course of the six months and is largely stable in
its intensity, with occasional spikes. The large-scale hijacking
events by China Telecom (AS23724) and Cox Communication
Inc’s (AS6298) on Apr. 8, 2010 [7] and Jun. 30th, 2010
[9], respectively, are two of the documented instances of
such spikes. In the case of unstable AS-links (green line
in the top graph), the number of spikes are more frequent
toward the latter half of our experiment period. This indicates
large instances of poor stability AS-links being observed. Due
to the lack of data regarding such events, it is difficult to
associate them with concrete events as in the case of prefix
hijacking. However, these results do indicate the importance of
monitoring AS-link stability with the same diligence as prefix
hijacking. We believe AS-TRUST provides the first step in
this regard.
V. REPUTATION COMPUTATION
At the end of behavior evaluation, we have a feedback
matrix for each AS. This will now be used to compute
reputation. The reputation will allow the observer AS to know
what is the probability of observing a service element in a
BGP service provided by an AS, being Good (or Bad or Ugly).
Given the service elements are orthogonal to each other, the
reputation for an AS is computed as a 3× 3 matrix R akin to
the matrix F ,
R =
 RG RB RUR′G R′B R′U
R′′G R
′′
B R
′′
U

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S1: <p1, {AS0, ASX..ASN}> Good
S3: <p3, {AS0, ASZ..ASN}> Ugly
S4: <p4, {AS0, ASQ..ASN}> Bad
t(S1) = 0.95 
t(S3) = 0.05
t1 t2
t(S4) = 0.4
AS0
S1
S2
S3
S4
t(S2) = 0.7 
S2: <p2, {AS0, ASY..ASN}> Good
Fig. 7. Time-line for Computing Refined Reputation
Here, the rows correspond to the reputation of the AS with
respect to an AS-prefix binding, AS-path, and AS-link binding
service elements, respectively. Each row is a vector represent-
ing the probability for an AS being Good, Bad and Ugly. We
do not arrive at a single number for reputation here, as it would
not be able to describe the behavior of an AS with the same
level of detail. In this section, we first present a reputation
model which has probabilistic semantics. We then present our
base reputation function and suggest improvements to it.
A. Reputation Model
We need reputation to provide a probabilistic view of an AS’
behavior. To arrive at the reputation we use Bayesian statistics.
Intuitively, if we have events with k possible outcomes, as is
the case with each of our behavior evaluation which produces
one of three outcomes, we can compute the posteriori prob-
abilities, i.e., the probabilities of observing these behaviors,
using the Dirichlet distribution if we assume the prior to be
a Dirichlet distribution as well [8]. Then, the reputation is
the expected value of a posteriori probability distribution. The
model presented here is a generalization of the one in [18].
Formally, suppose there is a process which can produce
k outcomes (u1, . . . , uk). Let, ~x = [x1, x2, ..xk] and ~p =
[p1, p2, ..pk] be two vectors where xi and pi represent the
number of times and the probability of the occurrence of
an outcome ui, respectively. Now, Bayes’ theorem states that
Pr(~p|~x) ∝ Pr(~x|~p)Pr(~p). In this case, the likelihood function
Pr(~x|~p) is nothing but a multinomial distribution. The prior
Pr(~p) can be many different distributions; however, we choose
the Dirichlet distribution as it is the conjugate prior of the
multinomial distribution. That is, treating the prior as Dirichlet
results in a posterior also being a Dirichlet. The Dirichlet
distribution is a family of continuous, multi-variate proba-
bility distributions. It is parameterized by a vector of reals
called ~α, and is given by: Dir(~p|~α) = ∏ki=1 pαi−1i /Z(α).
Here, p1, . . . , pk ≥ 0,
∑k
i=1 pi = 1, α1 . . . αk > 0 and
Z(α) =
∏k
i=1 Γ(αi)/Γ(
∑k
i=1 αi) is the normalizing constant,
which is the multinomial beta function.
The Dirichlet prior can be thought of as past experiences
with random process providing us with the probability of
observing αi − 1 number of outcome ui. Consequently, the
posterior probability distribution is a Dirichlet where the value
of the hyperparameter αi = xi + 1, can be thought of as
a sum of the counts of each type of outcomes seen in the
current experiments and in the past. As the vector ~p is a
vector of probabilities, for a given ~p, the probability density
function Dir(~p|~α) is a second order probability, which repre-
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Fig. 8. CDF of ASes with Poor Reputation Values
sents the distribution of the first-order vector taking specific
values. It is only meaningful if we compute the expectation
of the probability values in the vector ~p, and is given by:
E(pi) = αi/
∑k
i=1 αi. This expectation forms the basis of our
reputation calculation as it can be interpreted as the probability
of an AS providing valid RI.
B. Base Reputation
In a BGP service identified by the tuple {p,AS PATH =
[AS0, AS1, . . . , ASN ]}, AS0 is evaluated for Bp and Bl,
while AS1 to ASN are evaluated for Bo and Bl, resulting
in one feedback for each evaluation. We view each feedback
as a separate trial which produces one of the three outcomes
Good, Bad, Ugly. Note that, all subsequent discussion assumes
reputation is being computed for AS for the computation of
reputation corresponding to Bp. Computing reputations for Bo
and Bl is similar and not presented for brevity.
After M trials, let |FX | be the count of BGP services
contained in FX , where X ∈ {G,B,U}, and |FG| + |FB | +
|FU | = M . Let ~p = (pg, pb, pu) be the probabilities of
observing G, B and U , respectively, then we compute the
reputation vector of AS as R = [RGRBRU ]. Using our
reputation model, by setting α1 = |FG| + 1, α2 = |FB | + 1
and α3 = |FU |+ 1. Assuming that the prior probabilities are
uniformly distributed, we have: RG = E(Pr(pg)) = α1/αn,
RB = E(Pr(pb)) = α2/αn, and RU = E(Pr(pu)) =
α3/αn, where αn =
∑3
k=1 αk.
C. Reputation Refinement
An important property of the Internet is that poor behaviors
usually have very short duration [13][23]. Therefore, it is
more interesting to use reputation to determine the expected
probability of a service element in service provided by an
active AS is Good. In this regard, we refine the reputation
calculation by modifying the weight of the entries in the
feedback set to a value proportional to the time the service
remained active within a learning window. In other words, we
re-define |FX | =
∑k
i=1 t(si), where k is the total number
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of BGP services in FX and t(si) is the percentage of time a
BGP service si in FX is active within the learning window. As
Good behaviors last a long duration compared to poor ones, at
any given time within our learning window, the probability of
an active service having Good service elements will be much
higher than probability of an active service with Bad or Ugly
service elements. We illustrate the difference between the base
and refined reputations using an example.
Example: Let an AS0 provide four services S1, S2, S3, S4
where t(S1) = 0.95, t(S2) = 0.70, t(S3) = 0.05 and t(S4) =
0.40, respectively (see Figure 7). After evaluating the services
based on Bp, let S1 and S2 be classified as Good, S3 as
Bad and S4 as Ugly. As each service element in a service is
independent of the others, t(S1) + t(S2) may be greater than
1. In order to compute the base reputation in this scenario,
we have: |FG| = 2, |FB | = 1, |FU | = 1, therefore α1 = 3,
α2 = 2, α3 = 2, giving RG = 0.42, RB = RU = 0.29.
Applying refinement, we get: |FG| = 0.95 + 0.70 = 1.65,
|FB | = 0.05, |FU | = 0.4, resulting in RG = 0.51, RB = 0.21,
and RU = 0.28.
It can be seen that the refinement redistributes the probabil-
ity of poor behavior in a manner proportional to the duration
the service was active. We can compute reputation values
corresponding to other two behavior sets in a similar manner.
D. Reputation Analysis
In this section we analyze the reputation of ASes, generated
over a period of six months from Jan. 1, 2010 - Jun. 30, 2010.
As for each AS we compute six reputation values, in this
section we will be focusing on presenting only the results
of the reputation due to poor behaviors. The reputation due
to good behavior is a complement of the results and can be
easily extracted from these.
Figure 8 shows the CDF of reputations of ASes which have
at least one Bad or Ugly feedback for Bp, Bo and Bl. As
reputation of ASes is computed every day, we illustrate the
CDFs for a sampling of six days during the six month period.
These graphs demonstrate three important points: (1) among
those which do demonstrate poor behaviors, over 85% of them
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Fig. 10. Stability of Reputations
do so infrequently (in the case of Bo this number is over 99%),
(2) about 2-8% of the ASes which demonstrate poor behavior
do so exclusively (i.e., the spike near the very end of the
distribution) for Bp and Bl, and (3) over 99% of the ASes
have a reputation close to zero for Bo, which means they are
rarely involved in valley routes. The result demonstrates the
sensitivity of the reputation metric as it is able to capture even
those ASes which seldom do wrong.
The availability of a quantitative value for different aspects
of AS trustworthiness in the form of reputation, allows us
to mine emergent AS behavior trends which were heretofore
difficult to identify. In this regard, we compute the correlation
between different elements of the reputation matrix. Figure 9
illustrates the results. Interestingly, we find RU (i.e., demon-
strate prefix hijacking) and R′′U (i.e., are part of unstable AS-
links) have a very high correlation, over the six months of our
experiments. That is, ASes which have high RU also have high
R′′U . This is very intriguing as it increases the potential for low
stability AS-links to be malicious (spoofed links). None of the
other reputation values are strongly correlated. Particularly, the
lack of correlation between RB and RU indicates that ASes
involved in vacillating AS-prefix bindings are independent of
those which commit prefix hijacking. This provides another
anecdotal evidence to our earlier observation that vacillating
AS-prefix bindings are largely legitimate.
Finally, we evaluate how much the reputation values change
over time. In this regard, we take the daily reputation values
of ASes from Jan. 1, 2010 to Jun. 30, 2010 and computed
the maximum percentage difference between two consecutive
values. Figure 10 shows the results in terms of RB , RU , R′B
and R′′U . In all four cases we find that for over 98% of the
ASes, the maximum variation between two adjacent reputation
values was within within 0-1%. This means that the reputation
trend remains stable and varies very smoothly over time. As
RG, R′G and R
′′
G values are complementary to ones shown
here, the same stability trend holds for them as well. This
limited variation indicates repetitiveness of behavior.
VI. RESULTS SUMMARY
The following are the principal takeaways from these re-
sults: (1) Large Trust Violation: Relatively large number
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of ASes deviate from operational trust assumption of BGP;
(2) Emergence: There is a strong correlation between rep-
utations of ASes which hijack prefixes and those involved
in unstable AS-links; (3) Sensitivity: The reputation metric
is sensitive enough to capture even the smallest deviations
from the expected behavior; (4) Repetitiveness: Both good
and poor AS behavior patterns are stable over the course of
our experiments; (5) Consistent Presence: The number of
incidents of poor behavior is consistently present over the
course of our experiments.
VII. RELATED WORK
Little work has been done with respect to characterizing
AS behaviors. Most of the work has focused on detecting
prefix hijacking using control-plane [19], [20], [23] or data-
plane probing [17], [26], [27]. In [24] the authors use the
notion of reputation for accepting or rejecting updates. The
idea is to form a trusted overlay network over the existing
AS topology. Once such an overlay is set up, a node which
wants to determine the accuracy of an update, with respect
to prefix hijacking and AS path spoofing, can simply query
its neighbors in the overlay network. Similarly, in [16], the
authors present a reputation system for ASes, with a focus on
preventing propagation of bogus routing information. How-
ever, their mechanism also depends on computing reputation
based on an alliance of ASes. As AS-TRUST does not depend
on feedback from other ASes to compute reputation, it does
not have to compensate for any biased feedback.
In our earlier work, titled AS-CRED, [13], reputations
are computed for ASes based on their tendencies to hijack
or announce short-lived prefixes. AS-TRUST, on the other
hand, considers many more aspects in reputation computation
including valley free routing and AS-link stability. However,
the principal difference between the two is in the semantics of
the reputation value. For example, the Ugly reputation value
indicated how many prefix hijacking an AS performed. This
value is indifferent to the number of stable AS-prefix bindings
the AS had. Reputation in this case was simply a statement
of how Ugly an AS is and can be compared with the Ugly
reputations of other ASes to see how they fare in comparison.
With AS-TRUST, each row in the reputation matrix is a
normalized value and has a probabilistic meaning. Therefore,
Bad or Ugly behaviors of an AS cannot be seen independently
of its Good behaviors. The reputation values of AS-TRUST
thus provide a complimentary view of the AS behavior.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented AS-TRUST, a reputation-based
scheme for characterizing trustworthiness of an AS with
respect to disseminating valid reachability information. Repu-
tation is computed by evaluating past RI announced by each
observable AS in the Internet for the exhibition of specific
behaviors. The evaluation utilizes well-defined properties for
this purpose including the presence of: stable AS-prefix bind-
ing, stable AS-links and valley free AS PATH. It then classifies
the resulting observations into multiple types of feedback. The
feedback values are input into a reputation function which
provides a probabilistic view of trust. In the future, we plan
to build a reputation-based alert system which predicts the
validity of any new RI received.
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